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INTRODUCTION

During the Survey year, the Supreme Court of Illinois decided
matters relating to the admission and reinstatement of attorneys to
the Illinois Bar as well as the discipline of Illinois Bar members.'
The court disposed of the majority of these cases pursuant to a
court order, and without a written opinion.2 Analyses of the opin* B.A., 1977, Loyola University of Chicago; M.A., 1979, University of Notre Dame;
J.D. 1985, DePaul University.
** B.A., 1984, University of California at Los Angeles; J.D. candidate 1988, Loyola
University of Chicago.
1. The Survey year covers the period July 1, 1985 through July 1, 1986. Some of the
matters decided by the court during the Survey year, however, were initiated by the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission prior to July 1, 1985.
2. The matters decided by the Illinois Supreme Court that were not the subject of a
written opinion will be discussed throughout the footnotes.
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ions issued, however, should familiarize practitioners with the professional ethical guidelines that members of the Illinois Bar are
expected to observe and the various disciplinary proceedings by
which ethical issues are brought to the attention of the court. Accordingly, this article will discuss the cases decided during the Survey year in light of the relevant rules and mechanisms established
by the Illinois Supreme Court.
II.

THE ROLES OF THE ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT AND THE
ATTORNEY REGISTRATION AND DISCIPLINARY
COMMISSION

During the Survey year, the Supreme Court of Illinois restated
the proposition that it has the ultimate authority for implementing
attorney discipline. The court has described its power to regulate
the admission of attorneys to the practice of law, and to discipline
attorneys who have been admitted as an inherent part of the
court's function.4
In executing this responsibility, the court provides for the registration and discipline of members of the Illinois bar. These judicial
tasks are managed under the administrative supervision of the At5
torney Registration and Disciplinary Commission ("ARDC").
A.

The Mechanics of the ARDC

The ARDC is composed of five members of the Illinois bar appointed to the Commission by the Supreme Court of Illinois.6 The
Administrator of the ARDC serves as the principal officer of the
Commission and is also appointed by the court.7
Other components of the ARDC include the Inquiry Board, the
Hearing Board, and the Review Board. At least twenty-one members of the Illinois bar are appointed by the Commission to serve
annual terms on the Inquiry Board.8 The Inquiry Board investigates matters referred by the Administrator. 9 No less than twenty3. In re Williams, 111 Ill. 2d 105, 115, 488 N.E.2d 1017, 1022 (1986). The decisions
of the various Hearing and Review Boards are not published. Accordingly, only Illinois
Supreme Court decisions will be discussed.
4. In re Mitan, 75 Ill. 2d 118, 123, 387 N.E.2d 278, 280 (1979), cert. denied, Mitan v.
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission, 444 U.S. 916 (1979).
5. ILL. S. Cr. R. 751(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 751(a) (1985).
6. ILL. S. CT. R. 751(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. ll0A, para. 751(b) (1985).
7. ILL. S. Cr. R. 752, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 752 (1985).
8. ILL. S. Cr. R. 753(a)(1), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. ll0A, para. 753(a)(1) (1985).
9. ILL. S. Cr. R. 753(a)(2), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10A, para. 753(a)(2) (1985). Further, the Board may initiate investigations on its own motion, and may refer matters to
the Administrator to be investigated. Id.
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one members of the Illinois bar are appointed by the Commission
to serve annual terms on the Hearing Board. l° Finally, a nine
member Review Board is appointed by the court."
B.

The ARDC Annual Report

In addition to its duties of supervising registration and disciplinary proceedings, the ARDC is responsible for submitting an annual report to the court. This report evaluates the effectiveness of
the ARDC and recommends changes.' 2 The most recent report of
the ARDC, submitted to the Supreme Court of Illinois, April 30,
1986, demonstrated the ARDC's increased caseload over the last
ten years.' 3 According to that report, in 1976, the Administrator
initiated 1,740 investigations.' 4 In 1985, 3,935 investigations were
initiated, a 126% increase over the 1976 figure."
The 1985 report also classified charges of misconduct received
by the Administrator according to the type of misconduct charged
and the subject matter in which the attorney was involved at the
time of the alleged misconduct.' 6 The most frequently alleged
types of misconduct in 1985 included neglect, problems in the attorney/client relationship,' 7 failure to communicate with a client,
improper handling of funds, and conduct involving dishonesty or
fraud.' 8 The most common types of legal matters handled by attorneys at the time of the misconduct were torts,' 9 domestic relations, criminal, and real estate, including landlord-tenant.20
10.

ILL. S. Cr. R. 753(c)(1), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11OA, para. 753(c)(1) (1985).
ILL. S. CT. R. 753(d), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 753(d) (1985).
12. ILL. S. CT. R. 751 (e)(6), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 751 (e)(6) (1985). This
report is submitted on a calendar year basis. Therefore, it is not possible to directly apply
the statistics contained therein to the Survey year. These statistics indicate, however, the
general reoccurrence of types of misconduct which result in discipline, as well as the legal
contexts in which they typically occur.
13. 1985 ARDC ANN. REP. 4 (1986).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 11. These classifications are based on information obtained at the time the
charge is received, and before it has been investigated or established. Id. at 4.
17. Attorney/client relationship problems include disclosure of confidential information, improper withdrawal, abandonment, and failure to protect client interests. Id. at
11.
18. Id.
19. The tort context includes both personal injury and property damage. Id.
20. Id. at 4. The four most common types of misconduct and the five most common
types of subject matter accounted for over 50% of the total charges in 1985 and have
been among the most common in every ARDC report including this analysis. Id. at 4;
1984 ARDC ANN. REP. 12 (1985); 1983 ARDC ANN. REP. 6 (1984); 1982 ARDC ANN.
REP. 3 (1983); 1981 ARDC ANN. REP. 5 (1982); 1980 ARDC ANN. REP. 5 (1981).
11.
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C. Primary Objectives and ProceduralGuidelines
During the Survey year, the court decided matters involving attorney admission to the bar,2" discipline,22 and reinstatement.23
Prior to examining the specific issues resolved by the court, it is
useful to note the primary objectives and procedural guidelines reiterated by the court for these proceedings.
The court stressed the need to demonstrate good moral character and fitness to practice law in cases involving petitions for admission to the bar.24 The court emphasized that both attorney
disciplinary proceedings and reinstatement proceedings serve "to
safeguard the public, maintain the integrity of the profession, and
protect the administration of justice from reproach." 2
In addition to restating these objectives, the court identified the
tension caused by striving to achieve uniformity in the application
of discipline
while considering each individual case on its own merits. 26 The court stated that "[iln determining what discipline is appropriate, we consider the circumstances of each case and are
mindful of the discipline which has been deemed appropriate under
27
similar circumstances.
The court made several observations regarding procedural matters. The court noted that a respondent in a disciplinary proceeding is entitled to a hearing before an impartial tribunal. 28 The
tribunal established by the Illinois Supreme Court is the Hearing
Board.29 In hearings before this Board, the Administrator has the
burden of proving the charges of misconduct by clear and convincing evidence.3 0
21. See infra notes 34-50 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 51-245 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 246-88 and accompanying text.
24. In re DeBartolo, 111 Ill. 2d 1, 5, 488 N.E.2d 947, 948 (1986). See infra notes 4350 and accompanying text.
25. In re Rothenberg, 108 Ill. 2d 313, 323, 484 N.E.2d 289, 293 (1985). See infra
notes 256-76 and accompanying text.
26. In re Lenz, 108 Ill. 2d 445, 451, 484 N.E.2d 1093, 1096 (1985). See infra notes
79-95 and accompanying text.
27. In re Williams, 111 Ill. 2d 105, 116, 488 N.E.2d 1017, 1022 (1986) (citing In re
Lenz, 108 Ill. 2d 445, 485 N.E.2d 1093 (1985)). See infra notes 215-34 and accompanying text.
28. In re Betts, 109 Ill. 2d 154, 168, 485 N.E.2d 1081, 1086 (1985), cert. denied, Betts
v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Illinois,
106 S. Ct. 1949 (1986). See infra notes 144-63 and accompanying text.
29. ILL. S. CT. R. 753(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 753(c) (1985).
30. In re Betts, 109 Ill. 2d at 175, 485 N.E.2d at 1089 (citing ILL. S. CT. R. 753(c)).
See infra notes 144-63 and accompanying text. This standard is higher than the preponderance of the evidence standard used in civil cases. Id..
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Addressing evidentiary issues, the court reiterated that the common law rules of evidence, including the hearsay rule, are applicable to attorney discipline cases.31 The court noted that on review,
the findings of the Hearing and Review Boards are entitled to virtually the same weight as those of any other trier of fact. 32 Further, the court observed that issues concerning conflicting
testimony in attorney disciplinary proceedings are best resolved by
the hearing panel because it has the advantage of observing the
witnesses.33
III.

ATTORNEY LICENSING AND ADMISSION TO THE BAR

The court decided one admission case during the Survey year.34
Cases involving the admission of an attorney to the bar reach the
court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 708. 31 Rule 708 provides
for a Committee on Character and Fitness in each of the judicial
districts of the state. 36 Before admission to the bar, each applicant
is required to furnish the Committee with an affidavit "in such
form as the Board of Law Examiners shall prescribe concerning his
history. ' ' 37 Thereafter, each applicant is evaluated by the committee in his district "as '38
to his good moral character and general fitness to practice law."
If the Committee is satisfied that the applicant meets these prerequisites, he or she is certified by the Committee to the Board of
Law Examiners, 39 and usually admitted to the bar.4° If, however,
the committee is not satisfied that these qualifications have been
31. In re Williams Ill Ill. 2d 105, 113, 488 N.E.2d 1017, 1021 (1986). See infra
notes 215-34 and accompanying text. The Code of Civil Procedure and Rules of the
Supreme Court of Illinois are also applicable. Disc. COMM. R. 273, ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
1 A, foll. para. 744 (1985).
32. In re Lenz, 108 Ill. 2d 445, 450, 484 N.E.2d 1093, 1095 (1985). See infra notes
79-95 and accompanying text.
33. In re Betts, 109 Ill. 2d 154, 172, 485 N.E.2d 1081, 1088 (1985). See infra notes
144-63 and accompanying text.
34. In re DeBartolo, 111 111. 2d 1, 488 N.E.2d 947 (1986). See infra notes 43-50 and
accompanying text.
35. ILL. S. CT. R. 708, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 708 (1985).
36. ILL. S. CT. R. 708(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 708(a) (1985).
37. ILL. S. CT. R. 708(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 708(b) (1985).
38. Id.
39. ILL. S. CT. R. 708(d), ILL. REV.STAT. ch. 1 10A,para. 708(d) (1985). The Board
of Law Examiners consists of five members appointed by the Illinois Supreme Court.
ILL. S. CT. R. 702(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 702(a) (1985).
40. ILL. S. CT. R. 708(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10A, para. 708(c) (1985). Supreme
Court Rule 708(c) provides "[i]f the committee is of the opinion that the applicant is of
good moral character and general fitness to practice law, it shall so certify to the Board of
Law Examiners and the applicant shall thereafter be entitled to admission to the bar." Id.
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met, it files a report of its findings and conclusions with the Board
of Law Examiners. 4' After exercising his or her hearing rights
before the Committee on Character and Fitness, an applicant dissatisfied with the
determination of the Committee may petition the
42
court for relief.
In In Re DeBartolo,43 the Illinois Supreme Court denied Fredrick Francis DeBartolo's petition for admission to the bar. 4 Following an investigation and hearing, the Committee on Character
and Fitness refused to certify DeBartolo to the State Board of Law
Examiners. 45 The Committee stated in its report that the application submitted by the petitioner contained inaccurate information
regarding his high school education and past residences. Furthermore, the Committee was disturbed that the petitioner had incurred between two hundred and four hundred parking tickets and
twice had misrepresented himself to others as a police officer.46
DeBartolo petitioned the court for relief.47 The court's decision
emphasized the importance of candor in completing the required
application.48 Moreover, the petitioner's conduct of impersonating
a police officer and indifference to the many parking tickets he had
received compelled the court to conclude that the petitioner had
not demonstrated the good moral character and general fitness necessary to qualify him for admission to the bar. 49 Accordingly, the
petition was denied.5
IV.

THE DISCIPLINARY PROCESS

The majority of cases decided during the Survey year involved
Whether "entitled" is to be literally construed is an issue now pending before the court.
In re Loss, No. 3972 (Ill. filed June 4, 1986).
41. ILL. S. Cr. R. 708(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 708(c) (1985).
42. ILL. S. Cr. R. 708(d), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 708(d) (1985).
43. 111 Il. 2d 1, 488 N.E.2d 947 (1986).
44. Id. at 7, 488 N.E.2d at 949.
45. Id. at 2, 488 N.E.2d at 947.
46. Id. at 3, 488 N.E.2d at 947.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 6, 488 N.E.2d at 949.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 7, 488 N.E.2d at 949. The court analogized its decision to a case resulting
in discipline such as disbarment or suspension. When discipline is imposed on an attorney he may seek reinstatement after the passage of the applicable period of time. Similarly, the petitioner was allowed to reapply for admission immediately. The committee
evaluating any new application was instructed to consider all matters that would be relevant to his character and fitness to practice law, including his conduct during and after
the court's proceedings and his candor in filling out any new application. Id. at 6-7, 488
N.E.2d at 949.
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attorney discipline imposed after a finding of misconduct.5 ' These
cases reached 3 the court pursuant to either Supreme Court Rule
75352 or 761.1

The disciplinary process under Rule 753 begins with an investigation by the Inquiry Board.54 At the conclusion of the investigation, the Inquiry Board votes to dismiss the charge, to close the
investigation, or to file a complaint." When the Inquiry Board
votes to file a complaint, the complaint is prepared by the Administrator and filed with the Hearing Board.56
Either the respondent or the Administrator may file exceptions
to a Hearing Board report.5 7 If exceptions are filed, the Hearing
Board's report is then assessed by the Review Board." s If the Review Board concludes that disciplinary action is required, the Review Board's report is then filed with the court. 59 The respondent
may file exceptions to this report, and the administrator may petition the court for leave to file exceptions.' The court then decides
the matter and determines what discipline, if any, is appropriate. 6 '
When an attorney has been convicted of a crime, the Administrator proceeds under Rule 761.62 If the crime involved fraud or
51. See infra notes 52-245 and accompanying text.
52. ILL. S. CT. R. 753, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 753 (1985). See infra notes
54-61 and accompanying text.
53. ILL. S. CT. R. 761, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 761 (1985). See infra notes
62-69 and accompanying text.
54. ILL. S. CT. R. 753(a)(2), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 753(a)(2) (1985).
55. ILL. S. Cr. R. 753(a)(3), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 753(a)(3) (1985).
56. Ill. S. Ct. R. 753(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, para. 753(b) (1985). Proceedings
before the Hearing Board generally are conducted according to the practice in civil cases.
ILL. S. CT. R. 753(c)(5), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 A, para. 753(c)(5) (1985).
57. ILL. S. CT. R. 753(e)(1), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 753(e)(1) (1985). If
neither the respondent nor the Administrator files exceptions to the Hearing Board's report and the report recommends action by the court, the Hearing Board's report is submitted to the court as an agreed matter. Id.
58. Id. The Review Board may permit or require briefs, oral argument, or both. ILL.
S. CT. R. 753(e)(2), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 753(e)(2) (1985).
59. ILL. S. CT. R. 753(e)(4), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. ll0A, para. 753(e)(4) (1985). If the
Review Board affirms the findings and recommendations of the Hearing Board without
change, the report of the Hearing Board may be transmitted to the court along with the
Review Board's order of affirmance. Id.
60. ILL. S. CT. R. 753(e)(5), (6), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 bOA, para. 753(e)(5), (6)
(1985). The court may permit or require briefs, oral arguments, or both. ILL. S. CT. R.
753(e)(7), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 OA, para. 753(e)(7) (1985).
61. See ILL. S. CT. R. 771, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. IIOA, para. 771 (1985). During the
Survey year, five attorneys were disbarred, fifteen were suspended, and four were censured pursuant to Rule 753 without a written opinion. Per ARDC Records, November
1986.
62. ILL. S. CT. R. 761(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 OA, para. 761(b) (1985). Supreme
Court Rule 761 requires an attorney who is convicted of a felony or misdemeanor in any
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moral turpitude, the Administrator is required to file a petition
with the court requesting that the attorney be suspended until further order of the Illinois Supreme Court.6 3 Upon receipt of the
petition, the court issues a rule to show cause why the attorney
should not be suspended immediately."M After consideration of the
petition and the respondent's answer to the rule to show cause, the
court immediately may suspend the attorney from practice until
further order of the court.65 A hearing and review proceeding as
outlined above is then held to determine whether the crime warrants discipline. 66 For purposes of the petition, proof of the conviction is prima facie evidence of the attorney's guilt of the crime.67
If an attorney is convicted of a crime that does not involve fraud
or moral turpitude, the matter is referred by the Administrator to
the Inquiry Board. 6 Hence, the court's interpretation of whether
a crime involves moral turpitude could be dispositive of whether an
attorney convicted of such a crime is subject to immediate suspension pursuant to Rule 761.69

Disciplinary measures imposed in any disciplinary proceeding
include disbarment, disbarment on consent, suspension, 70 and censure. 7' Alternatively, the court may order that an attorney be
placed on probation. 72 For probation, the attorney must demoncourt to notify the Administrator of the conviction within 30 days. ILL. S. CT. R. 761(a),
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10A, para. 761(a) (1985).
63. ILL. S. CT. R. 761(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I1l0A, para. 761(b) (1985).
64. Id.
65. Id. During the Survey year, eleven attorneys were suspended until further order
of the court pursuant to Rule 761(b) without a written opinion. Per ARDC Records,
November 1986.
66. ILL. S. Cr. R. 761(d), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 761(d) (1985). If the
conviction is appealed, the hearing is delayed until the completion of the appellate process unless the attorney requests otherwise. ILL. S. CT. R. 761(d)(2), ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
110A, para. 761(d)(2) (1985).
67. ILL. S. CT. R. 753(b), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 753(b) (1985). The hearing and review procedure beyond this point is the same as that provided in Rule 753.
ILL. S. CT. R. 761(g), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1l0A, para. 761(g) (1985).
68. ILL. S. CT. R. 761(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 761(c) (1985). See supra
notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
69. The Administrator, however, also may petition the court, or the court may act on
its own initiative to suspend an attorney from practice during the pendency of a criminal
indictment, criminal information, disciplinary proceeding, or disciplinary investigation.
ILL. S. CT. R. 774(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. llOA, para. 774(a) (1985). During the Survey
year, the court suspended two attorneys until further order pursuant to Rule 774(a).
ARDC records, November 1986.
70. Suspension may be for a specified period or until further order of the court. ILL.
S. CT. R. 771(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I1b0A, para. 771(c) (1985).
71. ILL. S. CT. R. 771, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I1OA, para. 771 (1985).
72. ILL. S. Cr. R. 772, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I1b0A, para. 772 (1985).
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strate that continued practice will not cause disrepute or harm the
public, that he or she has a temporary or minor disability that does
not require treatment, and that he or she is not guilty of acts warranting disbarment."
In determining what disciplinary measures are appropriate the
court considers various mitigating factors. These include the
length of time that the respondent has been in practice, previous
misconduct, any restitution made by the respondent, past community service, prior pro bono legal work, and the testimony of character witnesses and colleagues."4
A. Mishandling of Client Funds
The majority of opinions involving attorney misconduct during
the Survey year concerned the mishandling of client funds.' 5 In
none of those cases did the misuse of funds result in the conviction
of a crime. Accordingly, they reached the court pursuant to Rule
753.76 The disciplinary measures imposed in those cases ranged
from censure" to a suspension for a period of two years.'8
In In Re Lenz,' 9 the court imposed censure for the mishandling
of client funds."0 The respondent had deposited $9,000, which he
received as a down payment for the sale of his client's house, into
his trust account. The attorney later used a portion of the money
73. ILL. S. CT. R. 772(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 772(a) (1985). Potential
conditions of probation include that: the attorney be required to report to the Administrator; the attorney's trust be supervised as the court may direct; the attorney complete a
course of study; the attorney successfully complete the multistate Professional Responsibility Examination; that the attorney make restitution; the attorney verify his compliance
with income tax laws to the Administrator; certain limitations be placed on the attorney's
practice; the attorney undergo psychological counseling and treatment; the attorney abstain from alcohol or drugs; and the attorney pay disciplinary costs. ILL. S. CT. R. 772,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 772 (1985).
74. In re Williams, 111 I11. 2d 105, 117, 488 N.E.2d 1017, 1023 (1986).
75. In re Cutrone, 112 I11.2d 261, 492 N.E.2d 1297 (1986); In re Fogel, 112 Il1. 2d
501, 493 N.E.2d 1078 (1986); In re Young, 111 Ill. 2d 98, 488 N.E.2d 1014 (1986); In re
Lenz, 108 Ill. 2d 445, 484 N.E.2d 1093 (1985); and In re Stone, 109 I11.2d 253, 486
N.E.2d 915 (1985). These cases involve violations of Canon 9 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Rule 9-102 specifically deals with the preservation of the identity of client
property and funds. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 9-102, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 110A, CANON 9 (1985).
76. ILL. S. CT. R. 753, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 753 (1985). See supra notes
54-61 and accompanying text.
77. See In re Young, 111 111. 2d 98, 488 N.E.2d 1014 (1986); In re Lenz, 108 Ill. 2d
445, 484 N.E.2d 1093 (1985).
78. See In re Cutrone, 112 I11.2d 261, 492 N.E.2d 1297 (1986).
79. 108 I11.2d 445, 484 N.E.2d 1093 (1985).
80. Id. at 455, 484 N.E.2d at 1098.
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to pay for a used van with a wheelchair lift for a disabled client.8 1
The trust account dropped below
the amount of the down payment
82
weeks.
six
for approximately
The Hearing Board recommended that the respondent be censured. s3 The Review Board, however, recommended a suspension
for one year.84 The court upheld the recommendation of the Hearing Board and the respondent was censured.85
The court relied upon several mitigating factors in determining
the proper discipline to be imposed. 6 This misuse of funds had
been the respondent's only act of professional misconduct during a
twenty-year career.8 7 Restitution was made promptly after inquiry
from the Commission,88 and the account contained insufficient
funds for only six weeks.8 9 Further, the respondent had performed
an extraordinary amount of pro bono work, 90 and had assisted in
the drafting of certain banking legislation. 91 Finally, several witnesses testified regarding the respondent's good moral character,
and the respondent openly had admitted his guilt and fully cooperated with the Commission throughout the proceedings.92
Despite these mitigating factors, the court held that discipline
was warranted. 93 The court noted that it is the risk of the loss of
the funds, and not simply their actual loss, which Rule 9-102(a) of
the Code of Professional Responsibility is designed to eliminate.94
Thus, the
court concluded that the appropriate sanction was
95
censure.
81. Id. at 448, 484 N.E.2d at 1094-95. The respondent originally withdrew the
money from his trust account as a favor to the injured party's husband who promised to
return the money to the respondent in two days. The husband, however, did not repay
the money, and the respondent did not replace the funds. Id. at 448-49, 484 N.E.2d at
1094-95.
82. Id. at 449, 484 N.E.2d at 1095.
83. Id. at 450, 484 N.E.2d at 1095.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 455, 484 N.E.2d at 1098.
86. Id. at 454-55, 484 N.E.2d at 1097-98.
87. Id. at 454, 484 N.E.2d at 1097.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 455, 484 N.E.2d at 1097-98.
93. Id. at 455-56, 484 N.E.2d at 1098.
94. Id. Rule 9-102(a) provides that all funds belonging in whole or in part to a client
that are paid to a lawyer or law firm must be deposited in one or more separate identifiable trust accounts. Further, these accounts must be in a bank or savings and loan association maintained in the state in which the law office is situated. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY Rule 9-102(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I 10A, CANON 9 (1985).
95. Id.
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In Re Young

96

also involved the mishandling of client funds and

the censuring of an attorney. 97 Again, the mismanaged funds belonged to clients represented by the respondent in the sale of a
house. 98 The respondent deposited $3,000 into a personal business
account rather than into a separate identifiable trust account as
required by Rule 9-102(a). 99 The balance dropped below $3,000
for over fifteen months, and the account was overdrawn at one
point.'11 The clients made several requests for a return of their
money, but the respondent refused to relinquish the funds before
the title cleared. 01
Both the Hearing and Review Boards recommended censure. 102
The Hearing Board concluded that there was no dishonest motive
involved in the misconduct and there had been a bona fide title
problem with the client's property which justified the respondents
retention of the funds. 1 3 Furthermore, the respondent had sufficient other assets to repay his clients. ° The Review Board affirmed these findings. 0 5
In determining the proper discipline to be imposed, the Illinois
Supreme Court looked at the Hearing and Review Boards' findings, the respondent's candor and cooperation during the proceedings, his twenty-five-year unblemished career and considerable pro
bono work. Finally, the court stated that censure was the appropriate sanction because the respondent no longer maintained an
6
active practice.

10

In In Re Cutrone,17 In Re Stone,'0 and In re Fogel lO9 the court
imposed suspension for the commingling and conversion of client
funds. In In Re Cutrone,110 the respondent received $50,000 from
his client's mother and friend to effectuate his client's release from
96. 111 Ill. 2d 98, 488 N.E.2d 1014 (1986).
97. Id. at 105, 488 N.E.2d at 1017.
98. Id. at 100, 488 N.E.2d at 1015. Due to an exception on the title insurance report,
the respondent was required to hold over $3,000 in escrow until the title was cleared. Id.
99. Id. at 101, 488 N.E.2d at 1015. See supra note 94.
100. Young, 111 Ill. 2d at 101, 488 N.E.2d at 1015.
101. Id. at 101-02, 488 N.E.2d at 1015-16.
102. Id. at 100, 488 N.E.2d at 1015.
103. Id. at 104, 488 N.E.2d at 1017.
104. Id. at 104-05, 488 N.E.2d at 1017.
105. Id. at 105, 488 N.E.2d at 1017.
106. Id.
107. 112 Ill. 2d 261, 492 N.E.2d 1297.
108. 109 Ill. 2d 253, 486 N.E.2d 915 (1985).
109. 112 Ill. 2d 501, 493 N.E.2d 1078 (1986).
110. 112 Ill. 2d 261, 492 N.E.2d 1297.
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a California jail.1" The respondent, however, used only a portion
of the money to obtain the release of his client.11 2 He then kept the
balance of the money, informing his client's friend and mother that
a refund for any amount remaining after his fee
they would receive
3
was deducted." 1
The Hearing Board found that the money deposited with the
respondent was intended to be used to post his client's bail and not
as a fee. "4 The Hearing Board recommended disbarment. The
Review Board affirmed the Hearing Board's findings.' 15
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the record did not contain
clear and convincing evidence that the respondent was not authorized to employ a bonding company or that he made no mention of
a fee. 116 On the issues of commingling and conversion, however,
the court found that the Administrator had proven that the funds
were not deposited in an identifiable trust as required by Rule 9used was frequently depleted and oc102(a), and that the account
17
casionally overdrawn.
The following mitigating factors were considered in determining
the proper discipline: the respondent's personal and financial pressures, his vigorous representation of his client, and the restitution
he made to the complaining parties."' The court concluded that a
two-year suspension was appropriate." 9 Justice Moran, however,
wrote a vigorous dissent, emphasizing that predictability and fair12
ness required the court to order the respondent's disbarment.
111. Id. at 264, 492 N.E.2d at 1298.
112. Id. at 264-65, 492 N.E.2d at 1298-99. The client's mother and friend testified
that they gave the respondent $50,000 because they were advised that the client would be
released and the full amount refunded, whereas, if they paid only $5,000, there would
have been no refund. Both also testified that they did not authorize the respondent to use
a bonding company, and that no fee had been discussed. The respondent, however, did
employ a bonding company, to which he paid a $7,000 fee. Id.
113. Id. at 265, 492 N.E.2d at 1299.
114. Id. at 266, 492 N.E.2d at 1299.
115. Id. at 267, 492 N.E.2d at 1300.
116. Id. at 268, 492 N.E.2d at 1300. The court found it unlikely that an experienced
criminal lawyer accepting a substantial sum of money from an incarcerated defendant's
mother and good friend failed to discuss with them the amount of his fee and the method
of payment. Id. at 269, 492 N.E.2d at 1300-01.
117. Id. at 268, 492 N.E.2d at 1300.
118. Id. at 269-70, 492 N.E.2d at 1301.
119. Id. at 271, 492 N.E.2d at 1302.
120. Id. at 273, 492 N.E.2d at 1302 (Moran, J., dissenting). Justice Moran compared
the case at bar to In re Smith, 63 Ill. 2d 250, 347 N.E.2d 133 (1976). In Smith, the
attorney made unauthorized use of funds from a settlement held for his client. Although
the court recognized similar mitigating factors, the attorney in Smith was disbarred. Id.
at 250-56. 347 N.E.2d at 135.

1986]

Professional Responsibility

A lesser suspension was imposed in In Re Stone,' 2 though commingling and conversion charges accompanied charges of conduct
involving fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, and moral turpitude in
violation of Rule 1-102(a) of the Code of Professional Responsibility,1 2 2 and failure to carry out a contract of employment in violation of Rule 7-101(a)(2) of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.123 In Stone, the respondent cashed a check issued
to him by his client to cover the costs of an adoption. He placed
the unused portion of the funds in his pocket and later discovered
the money missing. 124 Consequently, the respondent issued a
check from a personal account, which he knew contained insufficient funds, to the hospital to cover the adoption costs. 125 Also, he
issued paychecks drawn from an account containing insufficient
funds to his secretary. 126 Finally, the respondent failed127to complete
two adoption proceedings in which he was involved.
The Hearing Board found that the issuance of bad checks constituted conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, and moral turpitude. 128 The Hearing Board recommended
a
1 29
one-year suspension, and the Review Board affirmed.
The Illinois Supreme Court concurred with the Hearing Board's
findings of fact concerning the respondent's misconduct, 13o but imposed a lesser suspension of six months.'
In determining the appropriate discipline, the court considered that there had been no
evil motive with regard to the disappearing funds; the respondent
was admitted to practice in 1962 and had no disciplinary problems
until 1981; and finally, the respondent paid the hospital bill and
reimbursed his former clients for the extra costs and fees they
32
incurred.
121. 109 Ill. 2d 253, 486 N.E.2d 915 (1985).
122. Rule 1-102(a)(4) provides "an attorney may not engage in illegal conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation." CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule I-102(a)(4), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10A, CANON 1 (1985).
123. Stone, 109 Ill. 2d at 260, 486 N.E.2d 917-18. Rule 7-101(a)(2) provides that an
attorney may not fail to fulfill a contract of employment unless he withdraws as permitted
by Rules 2-110, 5-102, or 5-105, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 710 1(a)(2), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, CANON 7 (citing Rules 2-110, 5-102, 5-105).
124. Stone, 109 Ill. 2d at 256-57, 486 N.E.2d 916.
125. Id. at 257, 486 N.E.2d 916.
126. Id. at 259, 486 N.E.2d 917.
127. Id. at 258, 486 N.E.2d 916.
128. Id. at 261, 486 N.E.2d 918.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 266, 486 N.E.2d 921.
132. Id at 265, 486 N.E.2d 920.
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The case of In re Foge113 resulted in the imposition of a threemonth suspension.134 In Fogel, the respondent negotiated an agreement for the satisfaction of a judgment against his client with his
client's creditor. 35 The client gave $1,000 to the respondent to pay
the creditor. The checks that the respondent sent to the creditor
were returned, however, because of insufficient funds in the respondent's account.'36 The creditor's attorney filed a complaint with
the ARDC. The
respondent then furnished the attorney with
137
cash.
in
$1,000
The Hearing Board recommended an eighteen-month suspension. 13 The 39Review Board, however, recommended a three-month
suspension. 1
The respondent argued that censure was appropriate because
there was no dishonest motive or personal use of the client's
funds. 140 The court held, however, that censure was not an appropriate sanction. 14' The court observed that misconduct of this
character continues to recur despite repeated holdings that misuse
of a client's funds violates standards of the profession.142 The court
thus imposed the
three-month suspension recommended by the
143
Board.
Review
B.

Misconduct Involving Fraud in JudicialProceedings
Two additional opinions during the Survey year involved misconduct which did not result in the conviction of a crime, but for
which a suspension was imposed.'" In both instances the fraudulent misconduct occurred in conjunction with judicial
proceedings. 145
133. 112 Ill. 2d 501, 493 N.E.2d 1078 (1986).
134. Id. at 502-03, 493 N.E.2d at 1079.
135. Id. at 502, 493 N.E.2d at 1079. The respondent did not maintain a separate
identifiable trust account for his client. Instead, he deposited his client's funds in his law
office account. Id.
136. Id. at 502-03, 493 N.E.2d at 1079.
137. Id. at 503, 493 N.E.2d at 1079.
138. Id. at 502, 493 N.E.2d at 1079.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 504, 493 N.E.2d at 1080.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 504-05, 493 N.E.2d at 1080.
144. In re Thebeau, 111 I11.2d 251, 489 N.E.2d 877 (1986); In re.Betts, 109 I11.2d
154, 485 N.E.2d 1081 (1985), cert. denied, Betts v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of the Supreme Court of Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 1949 (1986).
145. In re Thebeau, 111 Ill. 2d 251, 489 N.E.2d 877 (1986); In re Betts, 109 I1l. 2d
154, 485 N.E.2d 1081 (1985), cert. denied, Betts v. Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Comm'n of the Supreme Court of Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 1949 (1986).
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In re Betts 4 6 involved fraud in the filing of a conservatorship
petition. 147 Prior to filing the petition, the respondent purchased
land on behalf of himself and his clients. 48 The transaction was
completed even though the seller had relatives who also owned an
interest in the land.' 49 The deed provided for the seller to retain
use of a portion of the5 0land for his lifetime or until his abandonment of the premises.1

Following many complaints from neighbors regarding the
seller's substandard living conditions and lack of self sufficience,
the county state's attorney suggested a conservatorship for the
seller. 5 ' The respondent subsequently
arranged for a conservator
52
and a doctor to examine the seller. 1

The complaint against the respondent alleged that he made a
false statement in his verified petition for a conservator, and that
he knowingly created false evidence. 53 In his verified petition, the
respondent stated that to the best of his knowledge, the seller had
no living relatives or property interests. The respondent, however,
knew of the seller's relatives and the seller's partial retention of the
use of the property sold. 54
' The false evidence allegation concerned
the physician's affidavit. The affidavit stated that the physician examined the seller, although he only visited the seller with the respondent,
and observed the seller's condition from across the
55
room.

The Hearing Board found the respondent guilty of the charges,
and recommended that he be suspended for one year.' 56 The Review Board, however, concluded that the charges were not proved
by clear and convincing
evidence, and recommended that the com57
plaint be dismissed.

The Illinois Supreme Court concurred with the Hearing Board
concerning the respondent's statements in his verified petition.'58
Thus, the court asserted that the respondent should have reported
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

109 Ill. 2d 154, 485 N.E.2d 1081 (1985).
Id. at 159, 485 N.E.2d at 1082.
Id. at 160, 485 N.E.2d at 1082.
Id. at 161, 485 N.E.2d at 1083.
Id.
Id. at 162-63, 485 N.E.2d at 1083-84.
Id. at 163, 485 N.E.2d at 1084.
Id. at 165, 485 N.E.2d at 1085.
Id. at 166, 485 N.E.2d at 1085.
Id.
Id. at 159, 485 N.E.2d at 1082.
Id.
Id. at 173, 485 N.E.2d at 1088.
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the existence of the seller's relatives. Further, the respondent
should have reported the seller's retention of the use of the property sold as an interest in land, albeit only a life estate.15 9
Regarding the physician's affidavit, the court did not agree with
the Hearing Board."6 Because the physician's affidavit did not
claim that there had been a physical examination of the seller, the
statement was not proven false by
court held that the physician's 161
evidence.
convincing
clear and
Because the respondent's untrue statements did not directly concern the seller's competency, the court concluded that the respon1 62
dent's actions did not constitute fraud upon the court.
Furthermore, the court considered the fact that the respondent,
who had practiced for only two years at the time of his misconduct, was unfamiliar with the procedures required in filing conservatorship petitions. Therefore, the 63court determined that a sixmonth suspension was appropriate.
The court took a harsher view of fraud in the context of a judicial proceeding in In Re Thebeau.1 4 In Thebeau, the respondent
was retained by three sons to probate their mother's estate. 165 The
sons agreed that one of them would purchase the decedent's house
from the other two. 166 The respondent allowed the sale to be represented as a sale in a single payment though it was an installment
sale.1 67 Also, the respondent, acting as a notary public, acknowledged signatures of two of the brothers on the contract, though he
had not actually seen the two sign the document.' 68 Finally, the
respondent allowed the two brothers' signatures to be forged by the
third brother on the quitclaim deed.169 These actions resulted in a
and the loss of a year's interest
bitter dispute between the brothers
170
on the assets of the estate.
159. Id. at 173-74, 485 N.E.2d at 1088-89.
160. Id. at 175, 485 N.E.2d at 1089.
161. Id. In In re Estate of Knutson, 83 Il. App. 3d 907, 912, 404 N.E.2d 1003, 1007
(1980), the physician's statement was found to be false. The court in Betts noted, however, that the standard of proof in that case was a preponderance of the evidence, whereas
charges of attorney misconduct must be proved by the higher standard of clear and convincing evidence. 109 Ill. 2d at 174-75, 485 N.E.2d at 1089.
162. In re Betts, 109 Ill. 2d at 176, 485 N.E.2d at 1090.
163. Id. at 177, 485 N.E.2d at 1090.
164. 111 111.2d 251, 489 N.E.2d 877 (1986).
165. Id. at 253, 489 N.E.2d at 877.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 253-54, 489 N.E.2d at 878.
168. Id. at 254, 489 N.E.2d at 878.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 255, 489 N.E.2d at 878.
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The Hearing Board recommended a one-year suspension, but
the Review Board recommended a suspension for two years.' 7 '
The respondent argued that the Boards' recommendations were
overly severe because the Boards did not appropriately consider his
innocent motive, his acknowledgement of misconduct, his coopera72
tion in the proceedings, and his prior unblemished record.
Although the court recognized these factors, and also noted that
the fraud was not carried out for personal gain, the court concluded that it was of an even more aggravated character because it
was practiced on the judicial system.173 Moreover, the court observed that the misconduct did not involve a quick failure of judgment, but rather a deliberate ongoing course of
conduct.' 74 The
75
proper.
was
suspension
court held a two-year
C. Incompetent Representation of Clients
In In re Hogan, 76 the Administrator filed a petition seeking the
interim suspension of the respondent, alleging that the respondent
failed to provide competent representation for his clients. 77 The
court denied the Administrator's motion, but, on its own petition,
transferred the respondent
to inactive status pursuant to Supreme
178
Court Rule 758(c).
The Illinois Supreme Court ordered mental and physical examinations of the respondent pursuant to Rule 760.179 The tests, however, revealed nothing of significance. 180 Moreover, the respondent
appeared to have practiced law for a number of years, preparing
pleadings and other documents, before evidence of his incompe171. Id. at 253, 489 N.E.2d at 877.
172. Id. at 255, 489 N.E.2d at 878.
173. Id. at 256, 489 N.E.2d at 879.
174. Id.
175. Id. Because the respondent already had ceased practicing law for a year, the
suspension was reduced to one year. Id.
176. 112 I11.2d 20, 490 N.E.2d 1280 (1986).
177. Id. at 22, 490 N.E. 2d at 1280.
178. Id. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 758 concerns mental disability and drug or
narcotic addiction. Rule 758(c) specifically provides for the court to transfer an attorney
to inactive status until further order of the court if the court determines that the attorney
is incapable of continuing his practice. ILL. S. CT. R. 758(c), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A,
para. 758(c) (1985).
179. Id. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 760 permits the court to order mental and
physical examinations of an attorney. The examining physician then prepares a report of
his examination; copies of that report are given to the court, the Hearing Board, the
Administrator, and the attorney. ILL. S. CT. R. 760, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para.
760 (1985).
180. In re Hogan, 112 Ill. 2d at 24, 490 N.E.2d at 1282.
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tence developed.18 1 Nevertheless, portions of the pleadings and
briefs offered in evidence were described by the court as adequately
clear, while other portions were "incomprehensible". 82
The Administrator filed a complaint against the respondent for
the "repeated failure to act competently" in violation of Rule 6101(a)l of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 8 3 and "intentional or habitual violation of established rules of procedure" in
violation of Rule 7-106(c) of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 8 4 The Hearing Board found that the respondent lacked the
fundamental skill necessary to draft pleadings and briefs, and
although the respondent's deficiencies were remediable, he was incompetent to practice law. 185 The Hearing Board recommended
that the Respondent be disbarred and permitted to apply for reinstatement upon a demonstration of competence.1 86 The Review
Board affirmed the Hearing Board's recommendation of
1 7
disbarment.
The court noted that "the purpose of disciplinary proceedings is
to safeguard the public and maintain the integrity of the profesAlthough the respondent was incapable of adequately
sion. '
serving the public, the court stated that disbarment is ordinarily an
appropriate sanction only when there is a finding of a corrupt motive or moral turpitude. 89 The respondent was guilty of no such
corrupt motive, but rather had a remediable disability. 90 Accordingly, the court ordered that the respondent remain on inactive
status until he was rehabilitated. 1
181. Id.
182. Id. at 24-25, 490 N.E.2d at 1282.
183. Id. at 22, 490 N.E.2d at 1280-81. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 6-101(a)(1) provides that a lawyer may not handle a legal matter when he knows or should know that he
is not competent to handle it unless he associates himself with a lawyer who is competent
to handle it. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 6-101(a)(1), ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. I1l0A, CANON 6 (1985).
184. 112 Ill. 2d at 22, 490 N.E.2d at 1281. Rule 7-106(c)(7) provides that an attorney
may not "intentionally or habitually violate any established rule of procedure or of evidence" when appearing before a tribunal in his professional capacity as a lawyer. CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY Rule 7-106(c)(7), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A,CANON
7 (1985).
185. In re Hogan, 112 Ill. 2d at 22-23, 490 N.E.2d at 1281.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 24, 490 N.E.2d at 1281.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 25, 490 N.E.2d at 1282.
191. Id. The Administrator was directed to confer with the respondent and the respondent's attorney for the implementation of a remedial plan. The respondent, the Ad-

1986]

Professional Responsibility

D.

Misconduct Resulting in the Conviction of a Crime

The remaining disciplinary opinions written during the Survey
year concerned attorneys convicted of crimes.' 91 In In Re
Thebus, 193 the Illinois Supreme Court censured the attorney as a
result of his criminal conviction. 194 Respondent Thebus had withheld funds from his employees' wages to pay their federal income
taxes and their FICA contributions, but failed to remit the amount
withheld to the IRS.19 The respondent pled guilty to a charge of
willful failure to file an employer's quarterly tax return. 96
The Hearing Board found that the respondent's conviction
demanded discipline, and recommended censure. 97 The Review
Board agreed with the Hearing Board's findings and
recommendation. 198
The court also agreed that the respondent's conviction alone established grounds for discipline. 99 The court analogized the respondent's misconduct to another case involving the willful failure
of an attorney to file an income tax return. 2" In the earlier case,
the court held that proof of the conviction did not necessarily establish moral turpitude, but did constitute misconduct warranting
discipline. 20 1 Accordingly, the court in Thebus concluded that discipline was appropriate, and concurred with the recommendations
of censure.2 °2
In Re Scarnavack20 3 presented a case of first impression. 2° In
ministrator, or both, may petition the court for an order of probation after the respondent
demonstrates the requisite competence to practice law. Id. at 25-26, 490 N.E.2d at 1282.
192. See supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
193. 108 Ill. 2d 255, 483 N.E.2d 1258 (1985).
194. Id. at 265, 483 N.E.2d at 1263.
195. Id. at 257, 483 N.E. at 1259.
196. Id. Although the Administrator could have proceeded under Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 761(b), taking the position that the respondent's conviction involved moral
turpitude, the Administrator proceeded under Rule 753.
197. Id. at 258, 483 N.E.2d at 1259.
198. Id. at 258, 483 N.E.2d at 1260.
199. Id. at 265, 483 N.E.2d at 1263. Another issue facing the court in Thebus was
whether the attorney's failure to file an employer's quarterly tax return amounted to a
conversion of funds. The court rejected this notion. Id. at 264, 483 N.E.2d at 1262.
200. Id. at 264, 483 N.E.2d at 1262-63 (citing In re O'Hallaren, 64 Ill. 2d 426, 356
N.E. 520 (1976)).
201. Thebus, 108 Ill. 2d at 264, 483 N.E.2d 1262-63.
202. Id. at 265, 483 N.E.2d at 1263. The Illinois Supreme Court disbarred Thebus
on consent on June 2, 1986, pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 762. During the
Survey year, the Court disbarred three other lawyers on consent pursuant to Supreme
Court Rule 762. Per ARDC records, November, 1986.
203. 108 Ill. 2d 456, 485 N.E.2d 1 (1985).
204. Id. at 460, 485 N.E.2d at 2.
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Scarnavack, the respondent was convicted in a United States district court of knowingly and intentionally possessing cocaine. °5
The Administrator argued that the attorney's unlawful possession
of a controlled substance constituted conduct involving moral
turpitude.2 "6
The Hearing Board found that the misconduct did involve moral
turpitude.2"7 The Hearing Board recommended that the respondent be suspended, that the suspension be stayed, and that the respondent be placed on probation to run concurrently with the
probation imposed by the district court.20 8 The Review Board,
however, concluded that discipline was not warranted, and recommended that the matter be dismissed. 9
The Illinois Supreme Court noted that this issue had not been
decided in any other jurisdiction.2 0 The court, however, did not
decide whether moral turpitude was involved, stating that an attorney may be disciplined for the conviction of a crime even if it did
not involve moral turpitude.2 1 ' Thus, the court held that censure
was the appropriate sanction. 2
In declining to determine whether the unlawful possession of
drugs involved moral turpitude, the court left unanswered whether
the Administrator should seek immediate suspension for this type
of offense pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 761(b). 21 3 It is apparent, however, that these offenses can still result in the imposition of
discipline. 14
205. Id. at 457, 485 N.E.2d at 1. The mixture had a "street value" of approximately
$35 to $40. Id. at 459, 485 N.E.2d at 2. Although the respondent was sentenced to six
months imprisonment, his sentence was suspended and he was placed on three years
probation. Id. at 457, 485 N.E.2d at 1.
206. Id. at 460, 485 N.E.2d at 2. The Administrator filed a petition requesting that
the respondent be suspended immediately pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule
761(b). The court declined to rule on the petition and directed the Administrator to
institute proceedings against the respondent before the Hearing Board pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 753. The Administrator's petition was ultimately discharged when
the court filed its opinion imposing discipline. In re Scarnavack, No. M.R. 3222 (Ill.
October 18, 1985) (order discharging rule to show cause).
207. Scarnavack, 108 Ill. 2d at 459, 485 N.E.2d at 2.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 460, 485 N.E.2d at 2.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 462, 485 N.E.2d at 3. Justice Moran dissented, adopting the Hearing
Board's recommendation of discipline. Id. (Moran, J., dissenting).
213. Interim suspension remains possible, even if the conduct does not involve moral
turpitude. See supra note 69.
214. In re Scarnavack, 108 Ill. 2d at 460, 485 N.E.2d at 2 (1985).
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In Re Williams215 and In re Reagan 216 involved convictions for
mail fraud,2 17 conduct generally held to involve moral turpitude.218
In Williams, the court determined that a two-year suspension was
appropriate. 21 9 The court also addressed whether certain testimony refuting the respondent's conviction was admissible in the
disciplinary proceedings, and whether findings made by the Hearing and Review Boards were contrary to the respondent's
conviction.220
The respondent's trial established that the respondent arranged
for his car to be delivered to his codefendant who then sold it to an
undercover FBI agent. 22 ' Later, the respondent received over
$10,000 dollars from his insurance company in conjunction with
the claim he subsequently filed for the theft of his car.222 At his
trial, the respondent stated that he thought his car was stolen while
it was being repaired, and that he was unaware that the car had
been transferred to his co-defendant to be sold.223 This testimony
was admitted into evidence by the Hearing Board.224
The Hearing and Review Boards found that the respondent believed his car was stolen, and that his only illegal conduct involved
misrepresenting to the police the location from which his car was
stolen. 225 The Hearing Board recommended a four-year suspension that would be stayed, and a probationary period to run concurrently with the respondent's federal probation.226 The Review
Board recommended a suspension for two years, or until the respondent was released from federal probation, whichever was
shorter.227
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the mechanic's testimony
215. 111 Il1. 2d 105, 488 N.E.2d 1017 (1986).
216. 112 Ill. 2d 511, 493 N.E.2d 1080 (1986).
217. In re Williams, III Ill. 2d at 108, 488 N.E.2d at 1018; In re Reagan, 112 Ill. 2d
at 512, 493 N.E.2d at 1081.
218. In re Williams, I I11. 105, 113, 488 N.E.2d 1017, 1020 (citing In re Needham,
364 Ill. 65, 4 N.E.2d 19 (1936)). In Williams, the Administrator proceeded under Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 761(b) and the respondent was suspended until further order of the
court on October 5, 1983 when the Administrator filed charges against him. In re Williams, 111 Ill. 2d at 109, 488 N.E.2d at 1018-19.
219. Williams, 111 Ill. 2d at 109, 488 N.E.2d at 1018-19.
220. Id. at 110, 488 N.E.2d at 1018-19.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 110, 488 N.E.2d at 1019.
223. Id. at 110-11, 488 N.E.2d at 1019-20.
224. Id. at 112, 488 N.E.2d at 1019-20.
225. Id. at 115, 488 N.E.2d at 1021-22.
226. Id. at 109, 488 N.E.2d at 1019.
227. Id. at 109-10, 488 N.E.2d at 1019.
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should not have been admitted into evidence by the Hearing Board
because it was hearsay. 22 8 Moreover, the court held that the testi229
mony was irrelevant because it related to the respondent's guilt.

The court stated that the respondent's conviction was conclusive
evidence of his guilt, and accordingly, it was not up to the Hearing
or Review Boards to retry the respondent's case.23° The court held
that the Hearing and Review Boards' findings were contrary to the
findings in the respondent's criminal trial, and were therefore
improper.231
Despite the court's disagreement with the lower boards' findings,
it concurred with the Review Board's recommendation of discipline. 2 32 The court noted that dishonest conduct warrants disbar-

ment, but relied on the Review Board's recommendation of a two
year suspension as well as several mitigating factors 233 in imposing
a more lenient sanction. 3
In re Reagan 235 also involved a conviction for mail fraud, but
resulted in a longer suspension. The respondent in Reagan, was
convicted of mail fraud in the United States district court. 23 6 The

court suspended the respondent for five years from the date of his
interim suspension.237
Over a period of ten years, the respondent aided and abetted a
real estate representative for Union Oil Company in a scheme to
defraud Union Oil.23 8 The scheme consisted of eight to ten trans-

actions whereby property was purchased for the real estate representative and then resold to Union Oil at a higher price.239
228. Id. at 114-15, 488 N.E.2d at 1021.
229. Id. at 115, 488 N.E.2d at 1021.
230. Id. at 115, 488 N.E.2d at 1022.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 119, 488 N.E.2d at 1024.
233. Id. at 117-19, 488 N.E.2d at 1023. This conviction had been the only mark on
the respondent's record in a sixteen-year career; he offered to make restitution; he participated in the community service work required for his probation and did much pro bono
work. Finally, the court noted the testimony of eight character witnesses. Id.
234. Id. at 119, 488 N.E.2d at 1023-24. Because the respondent already had been
released from federal probation and already had been suspended for over two years, the
court ended the respondent's suspension with the filing of its opinion. Id. at 119-20, 488
N.E.2d at 1024.
235. In re Reagan, 112 Ill. 2d 511, 493 N.E.2d 1080 (1986).
236. Id. at 514, 493 N.E.2d at 1081.
237. Id. at 512, 493 N.E.2d at 1081. Shortly after his conviction, the respondent was
suspended until further order of the court, pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 761. Id. See
supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
238. Id. at 513, 493 N.E.2d at 1081.
239. Id. The respondent handled the closings on these transactions, collateralized a
loan for the real estate representative, and funneled money from the transactions through
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The Hearing Board recommended that the respondent be suspended for a period of five years from March 21, 1982, the date of
his interim suspension. 2 10 The Review Board affirmed the Hearing
board's findings and recommendations.24 1
The Administrator argued that the respondent's conduct warranted disbarment, but the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the recommendation of the lower boards.242 The court acknowledged
that the respondent's conduct involved moral turpitude and had
continued over an extended period. 243 Nevertheless, the court em-

phasized that the respondent profited very little from his misconduct, and the respondent satisfied the civil judgment against him in
the amount of $287,000.24 4 Thus, the court held that a five-year
suspension from the date of interim suspension was appropriate.245
V.

ATTORNEY REINSTATEMENT

The final category of opinions written by the court during the
Survey year involved petitions for reinstatement. 246 Those cases
reached the court pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 767.247
The Rule provides that an attorney who has been disbarred, 24a dis-

barred on consent,249 or suspended until further order of the
court, 2 10 may petition the court to be reinstated. 25 1 The hearing

and review procedures for reinstatement are the same as those set
forth in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 753.252

Rule 767(f) sets forth numerous factors for the court to consider
his trust account. As compensation for these services, he received attorney fees of $8,500
over the ten-year period. Id. at 513, 493 N.E.2d at 1081.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 516-17, 493 N.E.2d at 1083.
243. Id. at 516, 493 N.E.2d at 1082.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 517, 493 N.E.2d at 1083.
246. In re Rothenberg, 108 Ill. 2d 313, 484 N.E.2d 289 (1985); In re Gottlieb, 109 Il1.
2d 267, 486 N.E.2d 921 (1985).
247. ILL. S. CT. R. 767, ILL REV. STAT. ch. 1 0A, para. 767 (1985).
248. See ILL. S. CT. R. 771(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. lOA, para. 771(a) (1985).
249. See ILL. S. CT. R. 762, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 762 (1985).
250. See ILL. S. CT. R. 771(e), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. l10A, para. 771(e) (1985).
251. ILL. S. CT. R. 767(a), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 767(a) (1985). This rule
states that an attorney must wait two years to file a petition for reinstatement after one is
rejected by the court. If an attorney withdraws his petition on his own, however, he may
file again after a single year. Id. During the Survey year, two petitions for reinstatement
were decided by the court without a written opinion; one was allowed and one was denied. Two other petitions for reinstatement were withdrawn during the Survey year.
ARDC records, November, 1986.
252. ILL S. CT. R. 767(h), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1l0A, para. 767(h) (1985).
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in evaluating a petition for reinstatement. These include the nature
of the misconduct for which the petitioner was suspended, the maturity and experience of the petitioner at the time discipline was
imposed, whether the petitioner recognizes the nature and seriousness of the misconduct, when applicable, whether the petitioner
has made restitution, the petitioner's conduct since discipline was
imposed, and the petitioner's candor and forthrightness in presenting evidence in support of the petition.2 3 These factors are considered in reinstatement proceedings to determine if the petitioner has
demonstrated his rehabilitation.254 Rehabilitation is the most important consideration in reinstatement proceedings and has been
defined by the court as255one's "return to a beneficial, constructive
and trustworthy role.
In In Re Rothenberg,256 the Illinois Supreme Court denied a petition for reinstatement.257 The petitioner had been disbarred on
consent shortly after his conviction of conspiracy to transport over
$100,000 worth of stolen jewelry in interstate commerce and aiding
and abetting in the transportation of stolen jewelry. 258 The petitioner received a three and one-half year sentence on the first
count, to be followed by a three year probation for the second
count.259 Probation ended in June 1983, the same month the petition for reinstatement was filed. 26°
Prior to his disbarment, the petitioner engaged in activities
which resulted in criminal indictments, including an indictment for
murder. 26' A jury found him guilty of conspiracy to commit murder, but the judge granted a judgment of acquittal notwithstanding
the verdict.262 After his disbarment, the petitioner was indicted for
obstruction of justice and conspiracy to obstruct justice, but was
found not guilty on both counts.263
Several witnesses testified in opposition to the petitioner's reinstatement, 264 and some presented letters to the effect that various
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
tice of a

ILL. S.CT. R. 767(f)(1-6), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A,para. 767(f) (1-6) (1985).
2d 313, 323, 484 N.E.2d 289, 293 (1985).
In re Rothenberg, 108 Ill.
2d 154, 159, 395 N.E.2d 571, 574 (1979).
In re Wigoda, 77 Ill.
108 Il.2d 313, 484 N.E.2d 289 (1985).
Id. at 326, 484 N.E.2d at 294.
Id. at 315, 484 N.E.2d at 289.
Id. at 317, 484 N.E.2d at 290.
Id.
Id. at 316, 484 N.E.2d at 290.
Id.
Id. at 317, 484 N.E.2d at 290.
Id. at 319, 484 N.E.2d at 291. Supreme Court Rule 767(d)(2) provides for nopetition for reinstatement to be sent to the president of each local or county bar
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bar associations had voted against reinstatement of the petitioner.265 The petitioner, on the other hand, presented letters in
support of his petition.266
In opposition to the petition, the Administrator argued that the
petitioner failed to notify his clients that he would be unable to
represent them after his disbarment, in violation of Supreme Court
Rule 764.267 Additionally, the Administrator raised several objections based on the petitioner's failure to comply with various requirements regarding the form and content of petitions for
reinstatement as established by ARDC Rule 402.268 Finally, the
Administrator argued that the letters introduced by the petitioner
in support of his petition for reinstatement were improperly admitted. 269 The petitioner asserted that the letters opposing the petition
were improperly admitted into evidence.27 °
The Hearing and Review Boards recommended that the petition
be denied. 271 The court noted initially that a disbarred attorney
petitioning for reinstatement has the burden of introducing clear
and convincing evidence of rehabilitation.272 The court examined
the petition in light of the factors provided in Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 767(f), focusing on the factor concerning the petitioner's conduct since discipline was imposed.2 73 The court concluded that the petitioner had not ended the pattern of behavior
that led to his disbarment, and that reinstatement was improper.274
Regarding the introduction of the supporting and opposing letters, the court held that the letters properly were admitted,
although they may have been hearsay. 275 Because Commission
Rule 273 regarding the admissibility of evidence in disciplinary
proceedings had not yet been amended, it was within the discretion
of the Hearing Board to admit them.276
association in which the petitioner practiced. ILL. S. CT. R. 767(d)(2), ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 110A, para. 767(d)(2) (1985).
265. In re Rothenberg, 108 Ill. 2d at 319, 484 N.E.2d at 291.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 320, 484 N.E.2d at 292.
268. Id. ARDC Rule 402 sets forth twenty-five separate requirements for the content
of a petition for reinstatement. See Disc. COMM. R. 402, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 A, foil.
para. 774 (1985).
269. Rothenberg, 108 Ill. 2d at 327, 484 N.E.2d at 295.
270. Id. at 328, 484 N.E.2d at 295.
271. Id. at 315-16, 484 N.E.2d at 290.
272. Id. at 323, 484 N.E.2d at 293.
273. Id. at 326, 484 N.E.2d at 294.
274. Id. at 326, 484 N.E.2d at 294.
275. Id. at 327, 484 N.E.2d at 295.
276. Id. at 327-28, 484 N.E.2d at 295. Subsequent to the filing of Rothenberg's peti-
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In Re Gottlieb277 also involved a petition for reinstatement after
a disbarment on consent.2 7 The petitioner's disbarment was a result of his conviction on two counts of mail fraud involving the
payment of $70,000 in bribes to public officials. 279 The petitioner's

participation arose out of his connection as attorney, member, officer, and employee of the Community Currency Exchange
Association.2 s°
28 1
The Hearing Board recommended that the petition be denied.
The Review Board affirmed the Hearing Board's recommendation.28 2 The Illinois Supreme Court noted the factors necessary to
consider in determining whether reinstatement is proper, 28 3 but

based its denial of the petition primarily on the petitioner's failure
to recognize the nature and seriousness of the offense he
committed.28 4
In his verified petition for reinstatement, the petitioner contended that his misconduct did not entail a breach of a fiduciary
obligation to his client, but resulted from being overprotective of
his client. 285 Also, the petitioner characterized his participation in

the bribery scheme as that of a "delivery boy".2 86 The court, however, stated that an attorney who admits he was guilty of misconduct cannot show rehabilitation unless he also shows repentance.
The court observed that these statements reflected the petitioner
view of himself as a victim rather than a participant in the misconduct.287 Because the petitioner failed to demonstrate any repen28 s

tance, his petition was denied.
VI.

CONCLUSION

It is apparent from the Illinois Supreme Court decisions during
the Survey year that the court's objective in the professional responsibility area was to assure that members of the Illinois bar postion, ARDC Rule 273, which prohibits the admission of a letter or affidavit attempting to
establish the character or reputation of a respondent or petitioner, became effective.
Disc. COMM. R. 273. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, foil. para. 774 (1985).
277. 109 Ill. 2d 267, 486 N.E.2d 921 (1985).
278. Id. at 268, 486 N.E.2d at 921.
279. Id. at 270, 486 N.E.2d at 922.
280. Id. at 269, 486 N.E.2d at 922.
281. Id. at 269-70, 486 N.E.2d at 922.
282. Id. at 269, 486 N.E.2d at 921-22.
283. Id. at 269, 486 N.E.2d at 922.
284. Id. at 271, 486 N.E.2d at 923.
285. Id. at 270, 486 N.E.2d at 922.
286. Id. at 271, 486 N.E.2d at 922-23.
287. Id. at 271, 486 N.E.2d at 923.
288. Id. at 273, 486 N.E.2d at 923.
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sess the moral fitness necessary for the practice of law. This
objective was discernible whether the matter before the court concerns admission, discipline, or reinstatement.
In a petition for admission to the bar, the court stressed the necessity for applicants to demonstrate good moral character. In determining whether this showing has been made, the court placed
considerable emphasis on the applicant's candor in completing the
required application.
In disciplinary matters, the court looked to the respondent's
ability to serve the public faithfully. Although innocent motivations and relative inexperience were considered by the court in
making this determination, the court strongly held that mishandling of client funds will not be tolerated. Moreover, the court
indicated that deliberate and ongoing fraudulent acts in the context
of judicial proceedings will result in harsh sanctions. Furthermore,
criminal convictions are likely to result in sanctions regardless of
whether the crimes committed involved moral turpitude.
Finally, in petitions for reinstatement, the court's focus was on
rehabilitation. The court stressed that a petitioner for reinstatement is required to prove his rehabilitation by clear and convincing
evidence. The opinions during the Survey year suggest that motivations for conduct are of greater importance when reinstatement
is sought than when admission is sought or discipline is to be
applied.

